This paper studies a model of strategic trading with asymmetric information of an asset whose value follows a Brownian motion. An insider continuously observes a signal that tracks the evolution of the asset's fundamental value. The value of the asset is publicly revealed at a random time. The equilibrium has two regimes separated by an endogenously determined time T . In [0, T ), the insider gradually transfers her information to the market. By time T all her information has been transferred and the price agrees with the market value of the asset. After T , the insider trades large volumes and reveals her information immediately, so market prices track the market value perfectly. Despite this market efficiency, the insider is able to collect strictly positive rents after T . † We gratefully acknowledge the feedback of David Pearce. We also thanks Markus Brunnermeier, Lasse Pedersen, and Debraj Ray and seminar participants at NYU.
Introduction
This paper studies a model of strategic trading with asymmetric information of an asset whose value follows a Brownian motion. An insider receives a flow of (noisy) signals that tracks the evolution of the asset value. Other traders receive no signals and can only observe the total volume of trade. There is uncertainty about the value of the asset before the insider gets the first signal, hence the first signal generates a lumpy informational asymmetry between the insider and the rest of the market participants. The signals the insider receives later are equally informative, but they contribute only marginally to the informational asymmetry. The information advantage continues until an unpredictable time when a public announcement reveals the current value of the asset to all the traders. Kyle (1985) introduced a dynamic model of insider trading where an insider receives only one signal and the fundamental asset value does not change over time. Through trade, the insider progressively releases her private information to the market as she exploits her informational advantage. The market is also populated by many liquidity traders that are uninformed and trade randomly. At time 0, the insider observes the value of an asset. The same information is publicly released later, at time 1, to all market participants. In each trading period in the time interval [0, 1] , traders submit order quantities to a risk-neutral market maker who sets prices competitively and trades in his own account to clear the market. The market maker cannot observe individual trades, but can observe the total volume of trade in each trading period. The market maker also knows (in equilibrium) the strategy of the informed trader, and sets prices efficiently conditional on past and present volumes of trade.
Kyle constructs a linear equilibrium where in each period the price adjustment is proportional to the volume of trade, and the insider's volume of trade is proportional to the gap between the asset value and the current market price. The market maker's estimate of the asset value, reflected in the current market price, improves over time. As the public announcement date approaches, this estimate converges to the value of the asset and the insider trades frantically in her desire to exploit any price differential.
Our model differs from Kyle's model in three important ways. First, the fundamental value of the asset follows a Brownian motion and therefore changes continuously over time. Second, in addition to the initial observation, the insider continuously receives a signal of the current fundamental value of the asset. Third, the public announcement date is unpredictable: it has an exponential distribution.
The first difference by itself is irrelevant. In Kyle's model it makes no difference whether at time 0 the insider observes the true value of the asset or just an unbiased signal. More-over, the model where the insider observes the true value and the value of the asset follows a Brownian motion is formally equivalent to a model where the initial observation is an unbiased signal of the final value of the asset. But this feature of our model becomes important when it is combined with the second feature. Finally, the third feature removes the pressure in Kyle's model behind the trade frenzy that occurs as the announcement date approaches. In our model, where the announcement date is not deterministic, the insider has no urgency to exhaust all arbitrage opportunities, and release all her private information in the process, by a particular deadline. Thus, while it is evident that in Kyle's model the price will become efficient (in the sense that it incorporates all the available information) as time reaches the announcement date, it is unclear whether in our model the insider will ever fully reveal her private information.
It is exactly this feature of the equilibrium of the fixed horizon model that Back (1992) exploits to develop his elegant "backward programming" solution method. In a model with a random horizon, Back's method is not directly applicable.
Our model is not the first to introduce a public announcement with random time. Back and Baruch (2004) compare the models of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) . To facilitate the comparison, they adopt a Glosten and Milgrom model with a single long-lived insider (who times her transactions strategically) and a Kyle model with a random terminal time and a risky asset that takes only the values 0 or 1.
Kyle's original model is in discrete time. The insider and liquidity traders place their orders at the beginning of each period and the market maker sets the price after observing the total volume of trade. Kyle then shows that as the period length ∆ converges to 0, the equilibrium converges to an equilibrium of the continuous-time limit model in which the agents can trade continuously and the market maker adjusts prices continuously. He then interprets the continuous-time model as a good representation of a discrete-time model where the agents can trade frequently. We maintain this interpretation and view the continuoustime model as a mathematical convenience that affords us the powerful tools of stochastic calculus. The discrete-time version of our model has a unique equilibrium that converges to a well defined strategy profile as ∆ ↓ 0. However, in our case, this limit strategy is not an equilibrium of the continuous-time model. The interpretation of the continuous-time model is therefore delicate and needs to be examined more carefully 1 . The lack of "continuity"
arises because in the limit the insider wants to trade at infinite rates after some time T . This allows the insider to collect positive rents even though the price perfectly tracks the 1 A recent paper by Fudenberg and Levine (2007) studies the limit of equilibria of infinitely repeated games as ∆ ↓ 0. They show that in general the limit of equilibria of discrete-time games does not coincide with the equilibria of the limit continuous-time game.
value of the asset after this time. However, after T , the insider's payoff function evaluated at the limit strategy is 0. Therefore, as we explain in Section 4, the limit strategy cannot be an equilibrium of the continuous-time model. To deal with this discontinuity while still using stochastic calculus, we introduce a sequence of continuous-time models with an arbitrary upper bound on the transaction rates of the insider. As the upper bound is relaxed, the equilibrium of the constrained continuoustime model converges to the same limit strategy of the discrete-time model. Thus, we interpret this limit as the appropriate "equilibrium" of the continuous-time model, even though this strategy profile does not satisfy the standard conditions for an equilibrium.
Our model includes various special cases. The value of the asset remains constant over time if the variance of its Brownian motion is reduced to 0. Since in our model the insider observes the initial value without noise, the signals that track the value of the asset over time become superfluous. This version of our model is similar to Kyle's model, where the insider is endowed only with an initial piece of private information, but with a random end time. Alternatively, we can specialize our model to give the insider no initial informational advantage. This is accomplished by informing all traders of the initial value of the asset. In this version of the model, the insider's informational advantage arises exclusively from her ability to observe the evolution of the asset value. This is an important model in its own right. An interesting question in this model is how the insider 'manages' the information asymmetry. For example, the insider could let the information asymmetry (the variance of the uninformed traders' estimate of the current value) grow to reach asymptotically a certain limit or without bound. The larger is the information asymmetry, the more likely it is that the market will substantially misprice the asset, and therefore, the larger are the profitable arbitrage opportunities. Thus, in this model as well it is not evident how much of the insider's information is incorporated in the market price and how quickly this happens. We study this special case in the process of constructing an equilibrium for our general model. It turns out that in equilibrium the insider fully reveals her information as soon as she receives it. Hence, the market price equals the asset value at all times. Yet, the insider makes strictly positive profits. In independent work, Chau and Vayanos (2006) reach the same conclusion (for this case without initial informational asymmetry) in a slightly different model. They assume that the insider receives a flow of information, the asset pays a dividend, and there is no public announcement. In addition, they assume that the market maker continuously observes a noisy signal of the value of the asset. In the absence of this noisy signal, their model would be formally equivalent to ours. Chau and Vayanos (2006) limit attention to the steady state of their model and do not study how the equilibrium approaches the steady state. One implication of our results is that in the absence of an initial information asymmetry, the steady state is reached 'immediately' (as the period length goes to 0), so although Chau and Vayanos (2006) assume that trading has been taking place indefinitely, this is not needed.
The equilibrium of our general model has a striking feature. There is a time T , endogenously determined in equilibrium, by which the insider reveals all her information (if the public announcement has not yet occurred). Thus, even though there is no deterministic deadline, the price converges to the asset value at time T . Moreover, time T divides the equilibrium into two phases. As long as the public announcement does not occur, in the interval [0, T ) the insider gradually transfers her information to the market and the market's uncertainty about the value of the asset decreases to 0 monotonically. In the interval [T, ∞), the insider trades large volumes and reveals her information immediately, so market prices track the asset value perfectly. Nevertheless, as we explained above, after T the insider collects strictly positive rents. In [0, T ) the insider is indifferent about her order quantities, though she trades according to a deterministic function of the current price and value of the asset. Therefore, she is indifferent about purchasing an additional share of the asset now or in the future, even though she discounts future payoffs. This is so because the market compensates her more generously in the future for any price differential. In [T, ∞), her compensation, as a function of the price differential, is constant over time, and thus she is eager to cash in her rents as soon as arbitrage opportunities materialize.
We conclude the Introduction with a quick review of the vast literature on insider trading.
2 Two of the most influential papers in the area of strategic trading with asymmetric information are Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) . These classic papers formalize the intuitive story of Bagehot (1971) that the market provides a mechanism to compensate informed traders for their superior information, while liquidity traders are willing to make (small) losses for the benefit of carrying out their transactions immediately. 3 The literature that builds upon Kyle (1985) is more closely related to our work. In a continuous-time setting, Back (1992) considers a general distribution for the insider's private signal (Kyle assumes a normal distribution) and proves the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium pricing rule. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) consider a market with multiple competing insiders. They show that competition among insiders 2 For a comprehensive review of this literature, and its connection to the broader market microstructure theory, we refer the reader to O'Hara (1997), Brunnermeier (2001) , Biais et al. (2005) , Amihud et al. (2006) and references therein.
3 Three notable extensions of the Glosten and Milgrom model are Easley and O'Hara (1987) that study the impact of block trading on the bid-ask spread, Glosten (1989) that considers a monopolist specialist that maximizes expected profits, and Dasgupta and Prat (2005) Back and Pedersen (1998) consider the case where the insider continuously observes private information, which evolves as a Gaussian martingale over a fixed time horizon. They assume that the insider's initial amount of private information is sufficiently high in order to prove that an equilibrium exists. We show that a similar condition is required in our setting with a random announcement date. Furthermore, we also show that it is precisely when this condition is violated -i.e., when the insider's initial private information is small compared to the inflow on new information-that our equilibrium reaches market efficiency at a fixed time T and preserves it thereafter. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the continuoustime model. In Section 3 we construct an equilibrium for a constrained model where the insider's trading rate is exogenously bounded. Section 4 discusses the limit of the constrained equilibrium as the bound on the insider's trading rate grows arbitrarily large. We also show that this limit strategy is not an equilibrium of the unconstrained model presented in Section 2. In Section 5 we prove, however, that this limit strategy provides a good approximation to a discrete-time model in which the agents act frequently. Section 6 includes our concluding remarks.
Model Description
The market participants are the insider, the market maker and a (large) number of liquidity traders. The insider (and only she) continuously receives private information about the fundamental value of the asset. The insider and the liquidity traders adjust their net holdings of the asset and the market maker sets the price at which these trades are executed continuously. This trading process terminates at an unpredictable random time τ when the fundamental value of the asset becomes public knowledge. At this time, the market price immediately matches the fundamental value and the insider loses her informational advantage.
Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space endowed with two independent standard Brownian motions B v t and B y t , where t ∈ [0, ∞) denotes (calendar) time. Let F = (F t ) t≥0 be the usual filtration generated by (B v , B y ). The value of the fundamental at time t isV t , which we assume evolves over time as an arithmetic Brownian motion
for some constantσ v ≥ 0. The initial valueV 0 is drawn from a normal distribution with mean v 0 and varianceΣ 0 . The insider alone observes the (stochastic) evolution ofV t during t ∈ [0, τ ). The market maker and the rest of the market participants only know the distribution ofV 0 . The random time τ when the value of the fundamental becomes public knowledge is exponentially distributed with mean 1/θ, and is independent of F. Liquidity traders are not strategic agents and they are motivated to trade for idiosyncratic reasons. They trade so as to match a moving target for their net holding of the asset. Their holding target Y t at time t follows an arithmetic Brownian motion dY t = σ y dB y t for some constant σ y > 0. We assume that the insider and the market maker knowσ v and σ y . We denote by X t the insider's cumulative orders (net position on the asset) at time t and by Z t = X t + Y t the total (net) volume of trade up to time t. Without loss of generality, hereafter we assume X 0 = 0 and Y 0 = 0.
The market maker only observes the process Z and cannot distinguish between liquidity and insider trading. As a result, the pricing rule {P t } that he selects is adapted to F M = {F M t }, the σ-field generated by Z t . On the other hand, the insider trading strategy X t is only required to be adapted to the finer filtration F reflecting her informational advantage 4 .
For a given pair (X, P ), the insider's expected discounted payoff Π(P, X) is defined as the difference between the discounted market value of her portfolio at time τ minus the discounted cost required to build this portfolio during [0, τ ). That is,
where δ > 0 is the discount factor and [X, P ] t is the quadratic covariation between X t and P t . Intuitively, this term arises because the price paid by the insider is computed 'at the end of the trading period', and therefore it includes the effect of the insider's 'last trade' dX t . 5 As a technical remark, to ensure that the insider's payoff is well defined (in particular 4 By letting X t ∈ F t we are assuming that the insider observes Z t . It may be more natural to assume that the insider observes the price process P t rather than Z t . However, in equilibrium the pricing rule is a monotonic function of Z t that the insider can invert. 5 In other words, to marginally change her portfolio from X t to X t + dX t the insider incurs an incremental
For a formal derivation, see equation (11) in Back (1992) .
the stochastic integral with respect to X t ) we restrict the process X t to the class S of semimartingales adapted to F t . For the analysis that follows, we find it convenient to define the intrinsic value V t as the expected discounted value of the fundamental at time τ given the insider's information at time t. That is,
We also define σ v =σ v θ/(θ + δ) so that V t is a driftless Brownian motion with dynamics
Let us also rewrite the insider's payoff using the following identity
where [X,V ] t is the quadratic covariation between X t andV t . Plugging this identity back in Π, taking expectation and canceling the stochastic integral with respect to the martingalē V t , we get
where µ = δ + θ. Note that the second equality is based on the fact that τ is exponentially distributed with rate θ and is independent of F t . We are now ready to define the notion of a market equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Market Equilibrium) A strategy for the market maker is an F M t -adapted process P = {P t } 0≤t≤τ , and a strategy for the insider is an F t -adapted process X = {X t } 0≤t≤τ such that X ∈ S. The profile (P, X) is an equilibrium if (i) for any 0 ≤ t < τ
and (ii) given P , Π(P, X) is bounded and {X t } maximizes Π(P, X).
One might think that condition (i) alone would guarantee that the market maker's expected payoff is 0. However, it is possible to construct profiles (P, X) satisfying condition (i) for which the market maker makes infinite losses. The condition Π(P, X) < ∞ together with (i) does ensure that the market maker breaks even in expectation.
The model is not exactly a game and our definition of an equilibrium does not coincide with that of a Nash equilibrium. However, Kyle (1985) suggests that this definition would coincide with that of a Nash equilibrium in a game where two market makers simultaneously bid prices after observing the current volume of trade and the winner gets the right to clear the market at the wining price 6 . In equilibrium, this competition drives the market maker to set the price at time t equal to the expected value of the asset's market value given the history of information he has observed so far and the insider's trading strategy. The market maker only uses his history to make inferences about the past choices of the insider and therefore, indirectly, about the distribution of V t . In equilibrium, P t evolves as a martingale with respect to the market's public information F M t . Intuitively, this property is consistent with the fact that any predictable drift on the price dynamics would be instantaneously exploited by the insider. By a similar token, one can argue that in equilibrium the market net holding, Z t , must also evolve as a martingale with respect to F M t . Indeed, given the martingale nature of liquidity trading, a systematic trend on Z t could only be interpreted as the result of insider trading driven by a mispriced asset. Below, we will characterize an equilibrium that is consistent with this intuition. A useful implication of both Z t and P t being martingales with respect to F M t is that we can connect the stochastic evolution of these two processes in a rather simple way. Indeed, under some additional technical conditions 7 , we can apply the martingale representation theorem to argue that there exists an F M t -adapted process λ t such that for all t < τ
That is, price changes are locally proportional to the volume of trade. Turning to the insider's trading strategy X t we see that in equilibrium she chooses her strategy so as to maximize her expected discounted profit, given that she knows how the market maker will choose prices. In Definition 1, X t is only required to be an F t -adapted semimartingale. In equilibrium, however, one expects X t to satisfy additional regularity conditions. For instance, it seems natural to rule out discontinuities in X t because they would immediately inform the market maker that he is mispricing the asset. (Recall that liquidity trading is driven by a continuous process). Hence, in equilibrium we expect X t to 6 To avoid collusion, we can assume that there is a large population of market makers and that each market maker participates in the bidding game only once.
7 Such as requiring P t to be a Markov process or requiring that P t = G(t, Z t ) for a deterministic function G.
This latter condition is commonly used in the literature to formalize the notion of a Markovian equilibrium, e.g., Back (1992) .
be a continuous semimartingale adapted to F t and to admit a decomposition
for three F t -adapted processes ξ, φ and ψ.
In the standard insider trading model (e.g., Kyle 1985 or Back 1992 , the fundamental value is constant and this value is is publicly revealed at a fixed time. Under these assumptions, Back (1992) proves (see Lemma 2) that an optimal trading strategy satisfies φ = ψ = 0 and so in his setting there is no loss in generality in restricting attention to trading strategies X t that are absolutely continuous with respect to time. As a result, the insider's trading strategy is safely hidden by liquidity trading 8 and her private information is never fully revealed to the market prior to the announcement time.
Despite the similarities, Back's method is not directly applicable to our setting with random termination time and a stochastic asset value. As we will see below, these variations lead to a fundamental change in the way the insider manages her informational rents. In particular, the unpredictability of the announcement date leads the insider to exhaust all her information stock by a fixed time T and then exploit instantaneously any new piece of information afterwards. Hence, in our model (for some range of parameters), the market price becomes strongly efficient before the public announcement. Efficiency is maintained after T because the insider uses a trading strategy X t with unbounded variation that fully offsets the price impact of liquidity trading.
To formalize these ideas, we restrict attention to a particular class of Markovian equilibria.
Definition 2 (Markovian Profile) We say that a strategy profile (X, P ) such that
is Markovian if ξ t , φ t and ψ t are deterministic functions of (t, Z t , P t , X t , V t ) and λ t is a deterministic function of (t, Z t , P t ).
Equilibrium with Restricted Trading
In this section, we construct a Markovian equilibrium for a constrained model in which the insider trading strategy X t is a process of bounded variation. Besides being a natural constraint in practice (i.e., transactions costs would be prohibitively high if X t were of unbounded variation), we impose this restriction to capture frictions that are naturally present in a discrete-time model. As we discuss later in Section 5, we view the continuoustime model as an appropriate representation for the dynamics of a market in which trading occurs at discrete yet frequent time epochs. Givenβ > 0, we now restrict the insider's strategy space to the set C(β) of all processes X such that
where β t is deterministic function of (t, Z t , P t , X t , V t ) such |β t | ≤β for all t ≥ 0. Hence,β is the insider's maximal transaction rate (per dollar of price gap). Obviously, if X ∈ C(β), then X is of bounded variation.
The continuous-time model with this constrained strategy space does have an equilibrium. When X is of bounded variation, the quadratic covariations [X, V ] t and [X, P ] t are both zero, and accordingly the last two terms of Π(P, X) drop out and
Let us suppose that the market maker uses the pricing rule
for some nonnegative process λ t . Then, under the restriction X ∈ C(β), the evolution of P t is governed by the following SDE
Note that both the insider's payoff function and the dynamics of P t depend on P t and V t only through their difference. Thus, we find it convenient to define the price-gap process M t = V t − P t with dynamics
The process
t is a driftless Gaussian process with variance σ
where B t is a standard Brownian motion. In equilibrium both λ t and β t are nonnegative and so the process M t reverts towards 0. We define the value function
The process Π(t, M ) is the insider's optimal expected profit-to-go starting at time t with an initial price-value gap M t = M . We note that M t and Π depend on both the pricing policy λ andβ. When we wish to emphasize this dependence we will include λ and/orβ as part of their arguments, for example, we will write M t (β) or Π(t, M, λ,β). The dynamic programming HJB equation for Π(t, M ) is
where Π M (Π M M ) and Π t are the first (second order) partial derivative of Π with respect to M and t, respectively. We will show that the profit-to-go is a quadratic function Π(t, M t ) = α t M 2 t + γ t , where α t and γ t are two deterministic functions of t. Then, the HJB reduces to 0 = max
The HJB is linear on β, so unless 2λ t α t = 1, the insider uses a "bang-bang" strategy trading at a maximum rate |β t | =β. When 2λ t α t = 1, she is indifferent in her choice of β t . The market maker's equilibrium condition is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose the insider selects a deterministic trading rate β t , and the market maker chooses the pricing rule (1). Then the market maker's equilibrium condition
where
, X] andΣ t represents its first derivative with respect to t.
Note that if λ t < 0, choosing β t =β > 0 is optimal because it maximizes current payoffs and increases the gap between V t and P t . For example, if V t − P t > 0 the insider maximizes the flow of profits when β t =β, while at the same time she decreases the price, and hence increases the profits she makes in future purchases. However, by Proposition 1 and the fact that Σ t ≥ 0, λ t and β t must have the same sign. Since β t =β > 0, λ t should also be positive, contradicting our assumption. Thus, in equilibrium, λ t ≥ 0 for all t.
In the following theorem we construct an equilibrium which is defined by a pair of deterministic nonnegative processes (λ t , β t ) that satisfy (5) and solve (3) for t = 0. The statement of the theorem requires some addition notation. Let L = 2σ vβ /σ y . Define the auxiliary function
(1 − x e −u ) 2 du and denote byk = min{x ≥ 0 | h(x) = 1}. One can show thatk exists and is strictly less than 1. We also define
Theorem 1 An equilibrium of the game with upper boundβ is characterized by one of the following two cases.
Case I: If Σ 0 > Σ then there exist nonnegative constants λ 0 and T such that
and k =k. Moreover, in equilibrium, Π(t, M ) = α t M 2 + γ t , where
The constants (λ 0 , γ 0 , T ) are determined by the value-matching conditions
Though the value Π(t, M ) is defined piecewise, it is continuously differentiable in t and twice continuously differentiable in M .
Case II: If Σ 0 ≤ Σ then an equilibrium is defined by (6), (7), (8) and (9) with T = 0 and
Let Σ ∞ = σ y σ v /β. In equilibrium, Σ t is monotone for all Σ 0 = Σ ∞ : strictly increasing if 0 ≤ Σ 0 < Σ ∞ and strictly decreasing if Σ 0 > Σ ∞ (and Σ t ≡ Σ ∞ when Σ 0 = Σ ∞ ). Moreover, Σ t → Σ ∞ as t → ∞. The equilibrium is truly Markovian with state variable Σ t , so in fact λ t = λ(Σ t ) and β t = β(Σ t ) (and similarly for the other variables α t and γ t ). There are two types of states: for Σ t ∈ [0, Σ], β t =β and the insider trades as fast as possible, while for Σ t ∈ ( Σ, ∞), the insider is kept indifferent and trades at intermediate rates. The monotonicity of Σ t implies that there exists a time T such that Σ t ∈ [0, Σ] for all t ≥ T , and hence after T , the insider always trades as fast as she can. When Σ t ∈ [0, Σ ∞ ), Σ t is monotonically increasing because even though the insider sets β t =β, the information that she transfers to the market cannot compensate for the volatility of the fundamental value. When Σ t > Σ ∞ , Σ t is monotonically decreasing and prices become more accurate over time.
We can define the actions of the insider and the market maker (as well as the auxiliary variables α and γ) in terms of the current state as follows. For a "corner state"
, and
Here 2λ(Σ t )α(Σ t ) ≤ 1 (with strict inequality if Σ t < Σ), and by the HJB equation (4), β t = β(Σ t ) =β is indeed optimal for the insider. While for Σ t > Σ we could still define (k, λ(Σ t ), β(Σ t ), α(Σ t )) as above, 2λ(Σ t )α(Σ t ) > 1 andβ would not be optimal for the insider (the insider's optimal action would be to set β t = −β). Thus, if Σ 0 > Σ, it is not possible to construct an equilibrium where the insider trades as fast as possible all the time. Note that when Σ t = Σ, k =k and 2λ(Σ t )α(Σ t ) = 1. For an "indifference state" Σ t > Σ, let (t, λ t ) be the solution of the system
That is,t is the time it takes (in equilibrium) for the variance to decrease from Σ t to Σ. It is easy to see thatt and λ t are increasing in Σ t . The larger is Σ t , the more time it takes for the variance to reach Σ and the more sensitive is the price to the volume of trade. Now let
Here, by definition, 2λ(Σ t )α(Σ t ) = 1 and the HJB equation (4) implies that the insider is (locally) indifferent. The definition of λ t above implies that λ(Σ t ) is continuous at Σ t = Σ. If λ(Σ t ) jumped down as Σ t ↓ Σ, the insider would have an incentive to delay her transactions until time T , and if it jumped up, she would have an incentive to act faster before T . The rate β(Σ t ) is also continuous at Σ t = Σ since β(Σ t ) ↑β as Σ t ↓ Σ. The continuity of λ also implies that α(Σ t ) is continuous at Σ t = Σ. When Σ 0 > Σ, it is not possible to set T = ∞ and make the insider indifferent all the time. If one sets T = ∞ in (6)-(9), the resulting value function Π(t, M ) and trading rate β t satisfy the HJB equation (4), and the pricing rule λ t also ensures that
The problem is that γ t becomes negative as t → ∞, which is a contradiction because the insider can always guarantee herself nonnegative continuation payoffs even when P t = V t . That is, setting T = ∞ implicitly involves making undeliverable promises (negative continuation values) to the insider. Thus, a switching time T must exist. T is the time it takes for the variance to decrease from Σ 0 to Σ.
Σ separates the indifference states from the corner states. We already argued above that the critical state Σ cannot be increased. We now argue that it cannot be decreased either. LetΣ ∈ (0, Σ) and suppose we make [0,Σ] the corner states and (Σ, ∞) the indifference states. AssumeΣ < Σ 0 < Σ. Then, in equilibrium, the insider would be kept indifference until Σ t decreases toΣ and then she would trade at maximal rate afterwards. But, since 2λ(Σ)α(Σ) < 1 and λ(Σ t ) and α(Σ t ) must be continuous, 2λ(Σ t )α(Σ t ) < 1 for Σ t slightly larger thanΣ, which is a contradiction because the insider would not be indifferent at Σ t , as required by the equilibrium.
The informal argument above establishes that T increases with Σ 0 ; the larger is Σ 0 , the more time it takes to reduce the variance to Σ. On the other hand, Σ increases with σ y .
9
Therefore, keeping Σ 0 constant, if we increase σ y , T decreases. We study a similar effect for σ v in Proposition 3 below.
Limit Equilibrium
We now relax the arbitrary constraint on the insider's trading rate and letβ go to infinity to construct a limit equilibrium. This limit equilibrium is not an equilibrium of the unconstrained continuous-time model. However, we will argue in Section 5 that the limit equilibrium approximates the equilibrium of any discrete-time model with period length sufficiently short.
According to Theorem 1, asβ grows large so does the insider trading rate in [T, ∞). In the limit asβ → ∞, the insider wants to trade at an infinite rate exerting control of unbounded variation over the price dynamics. Nevertheless, the following Theorem guarantees that both Π(t, M,β) and M t (β) admit a well-defined limit asβ → ∞.
Theorem 2 For eachβ > 0, let (k(β), λ 0 (β), γ 0 (β), T (β)) be the equilibrium associated with
σv σy e µT and T is the unique nonnegative root of the equation
The limit equilibrium associated with (0, λ 0 , γ 0 , T ) has two phases separated by the switching time T .
-Absolutely Continuous Phase in [0, T ): In this phase, the insider's trading strategy and market maker's pricing rule are given by
where β t and λ t are the two deterministic functions
The variance of the market maker's estimate of V t is given by
which decreases monotonically to 0 in [0, T ).
-Unbounded Variation Phase in [T, ∞): In this phase, the (inverse) market depth is constant: λ t = σ v /σ y , and the market maker's pricing rule satisfies
Moreover, the price differential M t (β) converges weakly to 0 over compacts in [T, ∞). As a result, the insider's trading strategy converges weakly to
T )] and Σ t = 0 for all t ≥ T .
-Insider's Payoff: Let (T − t) + = max{0, T − t}. Asβ → ∞, the insider's value function Π(t, M t ,β) converges to the quadratic function
In particular, in the limit equilibrium, for any t ≥ T , the insider's expected continuation value is Π(t, 0) = γ T = σ y σ v /µ.
The previous result summarizes a number of important features of the limit equilibrium. One of the remarkable properties of this equilibrium is the existence a finite time T , endogenously determined, such that M t ⇒ 0 for t ≥ T . Thus, the market maker fulfills his obligation in a rather strong sense after T . He is concerned with setting prices so that
. Theorem 2 implies that P t converges uniformly on compact sets to V t in [T, ∞).
10 Hence, in the limit asβ → ∞, the market maker knows exactly the intrinsic value of the asset and the price reflects this value at all times t ≥ T . Despite this market efficiency, the insider collects positive rents (Π(t, 0) = γ T ) in [T, ∞) because she can continuously observe V t and trade unbounded amounts each time V t separates itself (marginally) from P t . As a result, after T , the insider trading volume X t behaves as a Brownian motion and has unbounded variation. It is also interesting to note that X t − X T is independent of σ v . When the inflow of new information is small (for example, when σ v = 0 because V t is constant or the insider cannot track V t after t = 0), the insider would collect small rents after the market reaches full efficiency. Therefore, the insider spends instead her private information slowly and market efficiency is reached only asymptotically (T = ∞). This and other properties of the equilibrium are summarized in the following theorem. The theorem also establishes that in this case the limit equilibrium in Theorem 2 is effectively an equilibrium of the continuous-time game if we restrict the insider's strategy to the space B of trade rates β such that
Condition (11) rules out some bluffing schemes where the insider trades in the "wrong" direction and accumulates unbounded losses.
Theorem 3 Suppose the asset's volatility σ v (t) is a function of time, and let Γ t be the insider's cumulative inflow of private information from time t onwards, that is,
Assume that Γ 0 < ∞ and (Σ 0 + Γ 0 ) e −2 µ t > Γ t for all t. When the insider's strategy space is constrained by (11), there exists a continuous-time equilibrium that satisfies
Under the conditions of Theorem 3, in equilibrium Σ t ↓ 0 as t → ∞, but Σ t > 0 for all t ≥ 0. More importantly, the trading rate β t remains bounded for all t ≥ 0 so the insider's strategy is a process of bounded variation. If the insider's strategy space is not constrained by (11), then (12) and (13) still define the limit equilibrium, but this may fail to be an equilibrium. Theorem 3 again highlights the role of the flow of information. When this flow is substantial, the insider is happy to trade quickly to exploit current arbitrage opportunities. Even though in the process she "informs" the market about what she knows now, new arbitrage opportunities will develop soon. In the limit equilibrium, she transfers all her information (initial + flow) by time T . However, when this flow is relatively low, she is not willing to trade that fast.
In an equilibrium of the constrained continuous-time model, the market maker's expected payoff is 0. This property is preserved in the limit equilibrium. Thus, the liquidity traders' expected loss must equal the insider's expected profit. This amount is computed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the limit equilibrium, the insider's ex-ante (at time 0, before observing any signals) expected payoff-to-go is
is the market's best estimate of the insider's expected continuation payoff from time t on. The insider's expected payoff decreases monotonically with time in [0, T ) and stays constant after T . Thus, liquidity traders that place their orders late in the game expect to make smaller losses. One can show that the limit equilibrium satisfies the smooth-pasting condition
This is in contrast to the equilibria obtained in models that assume a fixed announcement date (e.g., Kyle (1985) ), where Σ t does not approach 0 smoothly.
To get a sense of how likely is that market efficiency is reached in the limit equilibrium, let us compare T and the average time at which the announcement date occurs, 1/θ. From the definition of T in Theorem 2, we can show that
(The inequalities are tight if the discount factor δ is 0.) Roughly speaking, the previous inequalities suggest that on average market efficiency is reached when the insider's initial (lumpy) private information Σ 0 is less than twice her average cumulative inflow of new private information σ 2 v /θ. Furthermore, one can show that as σ v → ∞ the switching time T converges to 0 and market efficiency is reach instantaneously. On the other hand, as σ v ↓ 0, the switching time T diverges to +∞, efficiency is never reached and the resulting profile coincides with the equilibrium derived in Theorem 3. The volatility coefficient σ v determines the amount of information asymmetry between the insider and the rest of the market. The higher is σ v , the faster the insider reveals her information, but also the larger is her profit.
Proposition 3 The value of Σ t weakly decreases with σ v for all t ≥ 0. On the other hand, the insider's ex-ante expected payoff E[Π(t, M t )] = α t Σ t + γ t is weakly increasing in σ v for all t ≥ 0.
The more volatile is the fundamental value, the faster the price adjusts to the current intrinsic value. However, this efficiency come at a cost. Indeed, the insider is willing to trade away her private information faster because the market maker compensates her for doing so. Hence, we expect market prices to be more informative when the volatility of the fundamental value is higher. For example, in the special case in which there is no volatility (σ v = 0), market efficiency (Σ t = 0) is reached only asymptotically as t → ∞ and the insider's ex-ante payoff is minimized.
Market Efficiency and Equilibrium
In what follows, we show that in general, the limit equilibrium cannot be an equilibrium of the unconstrained continuous time model.
Recall that the insider's expected payoff-to-go after time T can be written as
Let (Pβ, Xβ) be the equilibrium constructed in Theorem 1 and (P, X) be the limit equilibrium derived in Theorem 2. After time T , the market maker's pricing strategy P is given by dP t = λ T dZ t , where λ T = σ v /σ y , and the insider's cumulative volume of trade is a martingale process such that dX
. Thus, when M T = 0, the first stochastic integral with respect to X t has 0 expectation and the quadratic covariations between X t and V t and between X t and
That is, Π has a discontinuity at (P, X) as X is approached by strategies of bounded variation. For anyβ > 0, the equilibrium of the constrained model is such that the insider makes positive rents after the switch time T , when she trades at the maximal rate. Asβ ↑ ∞, those rents converge to σ v σ u /µ > 0. However, in the limit equilibrium, the insider makes no profits after T . Since Π(T, 0, P, X) = 0, (P, X) is not an equilibrium because, given the pricing strategy P , the insider clearly has trading strategies with strictly positive expected payoff. Thus X is not a best reply to P .
Discrete-Time Model
We now discuss the relationship between the limit equilibrium and the equilibrium of a game in which the insider trades at discrete time epochs. Specifically, we show that the limit equilibrium is indeed a good approximation for the discrete-time equilibrium as the period length goes to 0. In what follows we provide a brief description of the discrete-time model and its equilibrium. For a detailed discussion of this model we refer the reader to Caldentey and Stacchetti (2007) .
In the discrete-time model, the market maker opens the floor for trading only at discrete times {t n } n≥0 . These trading dates are evenly spaced over time (e.g., once a day) so that t n = n ∆ for some positive constant ∆. The interval of time [t n , t n+1 ) is called period n.
We let x n and y n be the orders placed simultaneously by the insider and liquidity traders, respectively, at trading time t n . We also denote their cumulative trading up to time t n by X n = n k=0 x k and Y n = n k=0 y k , respectively. As before, we assume that the market maker is not able to differentiate between insider and liquidity trading. He observes only the net volume of trade z n = x n + y n and the net market holding Z n = X n + Y n at every trading time t n .
Consistent with the continuous-time setting, we assume that the insider observes the evolution of the asset value. That is, at every trading epoch t n , and before placing her order, she observes the intrinsic value V n which evolves as a random walk with i.i.d. increments that are normally distributed with variance Σ v = σ 2 v ∆. Similarly, we assume that liquidity trading follows a random walk: in particular {y n } is a sequence of i.i.d. normal random variables with mean 0 and variances Σ y = σ 2 y ∆. At the beginning of each period n, before the fundamental value becomes public knowledge, the market maker commits to a pricing rule (that is legally binding). The rule specifies the price P n for the current period's transactions as a function of the total volume of trade z n . The insider and the liquidity traders place their orders after the rule is announced. All orders are executed at the end of the period. Note that while the market maker commits to a rule before knowing the current period's volume of trade, the actual price is determined after learning the volume of trade.
Given a strategy {X n } for the insider's holding and market prices {P n }, the insider's expected payoff is
where ν denotes the period when the value of the asset becomes public knowledge. (We assume that this announcement always occurs at the end of the period, after the current orders are executed.) The discrete random variable ν has a geometric distribution with probability of failure q = e −θ∆ .
We will restrict attention to linear Markovian equilibria with a particular state space. At the beginning of period n, before the market maker observes the volume of trade, the state is (n, v n−1 , Σ n−1 ), where v n−1 is the market maker's estimate of V n and Σ n−1 is the variance of this estimate. Since the market maker's estimate of V n depends on the strategy X of the insider, the state and corresponding Markovian strategy profile need to be specified simultaneously.
The following definition formalizes the notion of a linear Markovian profile that we will use to characterize the equilibria of this discrete-time model.
Definition 3 (Linear Markovian Equilibrium) We say that a strategy (P, X) is a linear Markovian profile if there exist two sequences of functions {λ n } and {β n } such that the price P n and the insider trading x n , in period n, satisfy
In addition, the profile (P, X) is an equilibrium if (i) P n = E[V n |X, z k , k = 0, 1, . . . , n] for any n ≥ 0 and (ii) given P , Π(P, X) is bounded above and {X n } maximizes Π(P, X).
With the notation above, we can express
Since V n+1 − V n is an independent normal random variable, P n = v n . Before the game starts, v −1 is the market maker's estimate of V 0 and Σ −1 is the variance of this estimate. We characterize a unique linear Markovian equilibrium in the following theorem, whose statement requires some additional notation and whose proof can be found in Caldentey and Stacchetti (2007) . Let Π n (p, Σ, V ) be the insider's expected payoff-to-go from period n onwards conditional on V n = V , P n−1 = p and Σ n−1 = Σ. We also define ρ = e −µ∆ with
Theorem 4 There exist unique sequences {λ n }, {β n } ∈ R ++ such that the linear strategy profile (P, X) defined by (14) is a Markovian equilibrium. In equilibrium, {Σ n } is a deterministic trajectory that is not affected by the (stochastic) choices of the insider and the market maker. Starting from (Σ −1 , β 0 ), the values of λ n , β n and Σ n are determined recursively solving
Furthermore, there exist sequences {α n }, {γ n } ⊂ R ++ such that the insider's expected payoff-
We devote the remainder of this section to showing that the discrete-time linear Markovian equilibrium in discrete-time converges to the limit equilibrium of Theorem 2 as ∆ ↓ 0. (15), that is,
is uniquely specified by β ∆ 0 and (18). The pair of difference equations in (18) can be rewritten as
which suggests that these equations can be approximated by a pair of differential equations for ∆ sufficiently small. For a given t, suppose that lim sup ∆↓0 (β
Since the condition lim sup ∆↓0 (β ∆ t ) 2 Σ ∆ t < ∞ is trivially satisfied at t = 0, we expect (by continuity) that the convergence above holds for all t ∈ [0, τ ) for some positive τ > 0. Then, integrating (21) in this range we obtain a continuous profile (Σ 0 t , β 0 t ) given by
Note that for this continuous-time solution, the condition lim sup ∆↓0 (β 
We will denote this solution by τ (β 0 ) to emphasize its dependence on the initial condition β 0 . If such a solution does not exist then we set τ (β 0 ) = ∞ and the continuous-time approximation holds for all t ≥ 0.
According to the previous discussion, the discrete-time equilibrium (Σ Proposition 4 Let η ≥ 2 be the unique root of the equation
The proof of the proposition can be found in Caldentey and Stacchetti (2007) . According to this result, as ∆ ↓ 0, the initial condition β ∆ 0 that characterized the discretetime equilibrium converges toβ 0 . It follows then from our previous discussion that for all t < τ (β 0 ),
The proof of Proposition 4 reveals that at t = τ (β 0 ), both Σ 0 t = 0 andΣ 0 t = 0. That is, the limit equilibrium satisfies a smooth pasting condition.
One can also show that τ (β 0 ) is equal to T in Theorem 2 and that the limiting solution (Σ 0 t , β 0 t ) above coincides with the limit equilibrium (Σ t , β t ) derived in Theorem 2 for t < T . In other words, for ∆ small, the discrete-time equilibrium is well approximated by the absolutely continuous phase of the limit equilibrium.
As for what happens after time T , we note that there is no real discrete-time counterpart for the unbounded variation phase. In fact, for the continuous-time model, T is the time at which the system reaches stationarity. In discrete time, however, stationarity is reached only asymptotically (unless Σ 0 = 0). Nevertheless, the continuous-time variance process Σ t in Theorem 2 is a good approximation of the discrete-time variance Σ ∆ t for all t ≥ 0. Indeed, for ∆ sufficiently small, the discrete-time variance Σ ∆ t is nonincreasing in t and, since Σ t = 0 for all t ≥ T , it follows that
In summary, the limiting equilibrium of Theorem 2 is a good approximation of the equilibrium of the discrete-time model when ∆ is small.
Conclusions
The paper introduces a model that combines a random announcement time with an insider who receives a flow of information as well as an initial signal. The new model produces a (limit) equilibrium with novel features. The insider is confronted with two distinct incentive regimes. Before the endogenous time T , she is indifferent about how to consume her information stock, which includes the initial signal and the flow information she receives in the interval [0, T ]. Nevertheless, in equilibrium she exhausts all this stock by time T , so that the market reaches full efficiency at time T . After T she is eager to exhaust any additional piece of information immediately. As she does, she keeps the market fully informed until the announcement date, which reveals no further information. The flow of new information, that in principle exacerbates the informational asymmetry, in equilibrium induces the insider to release her information faster. As an intriguing consequence, the market is uniformly better informed and reaches full efficiency earlier when this source of informational asymmetry (the variation of the innovation process) is larger.
The analysis also exposes a potential vulnerability of continuous-time models. The natural discrete-time model has an equilibrium that, albeit difficult to construct explicitly, has a well defined limit as the period length decreases to 0. However, this limit equilibrium is not an equilibrium of the corresponding continuous-time model. The same limit equilibrium is recovered as the limit of equilibria of a sequence of constrained continuous-time models, where the insider's rate of transaction is exogenously bounded.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The condition
Hence, we can interpret the market maker's equilibrium condition as the solution to a classical Kalman-Bucy filtering problem. Let the signal process be the value of the fundamental V t , with dynamics
and the observation process be the price process P t , with dynamics
Let v t be the corresponding optimal (in mean square sense) filtering estimate of V t and Σ t be the filtering error. Then, the equilibrium condition is P t = v t . The generalized Kalman filter conditions for the pair (V t , P t ) are given by
To recover the identity P t = v t we need to impose that
This equality together with the border condition v 0 = P 0 imply that v t = P t for all t > 0. This equality also implies that (Σ t β t ) 2 = λ 2 t σ 4 y . Therefore, the second filtering condition leads to the differential equationΣ
which completes the proof of the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1.
To prove this theorem we establish that (i) λ t satisfies the filtering condition (5) for the market-maker; and (ii) given λ t , (β t , Π(t, M )) solves the HJB equation (4).
Filtering Conditons: In [0, T ), (6) and (7) imply that Σ t β t = σ 2 y λ t = σ 2 y λ 0 e −µ t , and the second filtering condition of (5) is satisfied if and only iḟ
The solution of this differential equation is
In (T, ∞), β t ≡β. In this case, the filtering conditions (5) become
The second filtering equation leads to the differential equation
Therefore, the filtering conditions are satisfied if and only if
for some constant of integration k. Note that λ t and Σ t are decreasing in t if and only if k ≥ 0, a fact we establish below.
Optimality Conditons: We prove only Case I. The proof of Case II follows directly from this derivation. We guess that Π(t, M ) = α t M 2 + γ t , with the coefficients α t and γ t defined by (8) and (9). Then, the HJB equation becomes 0 = max
Note that the right-hand side is linear in β, and recall that σ
y . In (0, T ), 0 < β t <β. Thus, the HJB equation is satisfied if and only ifα t − µ α t = 0, 1 − 2λ t α t = 0, and α t (σ 
for some constant γ 0 . In (T, ∞), β t ≡β, so the HJB equation is satisfied if and only if 1 − 2λ t α t ≥ 0,
We check the last two conditions first. The coefficient α t defined by (8) satisfieṡ
The coefficient γ t defined by (9) satisfieṡ
Finally we show that 2 λ t α t < 1 for all t ∈ (T, ∞). Since 2 λ t α t = 1 for all t ∈ (0, T ), we have that 2 λ − T α − T = 1. The value-matching conditions (10) also require that λ − T = λ T and α − T = α T . Therefore 2 λ T α T = 1. To ensure the nonnegativity of λ t for t ≥ T , we must require that |k| ≤ 1. Using the definitions of λ t and α t for t ≥ T , and with the change of variable u = L s, it follows that
Note that the border condition 2 α T λ T = 1 reduces to h(k) = 1 (a condition that is independent of T !). For notational convenience, let us define the constant a = 1 + µ/L In the argument that follows we will show that forβ sufficiently large there exists a unique k ∈ [−1, 1] that solves h(k) = 1. Furthermore, we will show that k > 0 and that h( ) is increasing in for ∈ [0, k]. As a result, 2 α t λ t = h k e −L(t−T ) < h(k) = 1 for all t > T , as required. Although the proof of these steps is tedious, the intuition is rather straightforward if we note that h( ) ≈ (1 + )/a forβ sufficiently large (or equivalently, for a close to one). To prove that k > 0 note that
To prove the existence, we compute a lower bound for h( ):
where the inequality follows from the fact that a ≥ 1 and ≥ 0. This lower bound is equal to 1 at = a − 1 = µ/L. Hence, forβ sufficiently large µ/L < 1 and h(µ/L) > 1. Since h( ) is continuous and h(0) = 1/a < 1, there exists k ∈ (0, µ/L) such that h(k) = 1. Assume thatβ is sufficiently large so that µ/L < 1. We now conclude the proof by showing that h(k) is increasing in ∈ [0, µ/L] which shows, by virtue of the lower bound above, that k is unique and that h( ) ≤ h(k) for all ∈ [0, k), as needed. For this, note that for all
where the last inequality uses the fact that (2 − ) is increasing in ∈ [0, 1], so (2 − ) ≤ (3 − a)(a − 1), and the inequality a(a 2 − 1) > 0. Therefore, h ( ) > 0 for allβ sufficiently large so that a ≤ 5/3 To show that Π(t, M ) = α t M 2 + γ t is continuously differentiable once in t and twice in M , note that the value matching conditions (10) imply that λ t , α t and γ t are continuous functions of t. Π(t, M ) is clearly twice continuously differentiable in M . Hence, we need only show that α t and γ t are continuously differentiable at t = T . Equations (8), (23), (9) and (24) To complete the proof one can show, after tedious computations, that β t is increasing in t ∈ [0, T ]. Since β T =β, the insider's strategy satisfies |β t | ≤β for all t.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Assume thatβ is sufficiently large so that µ/L < 1/2. By Theorem 1, 0 < k(β) < µ/L. Hence
Since L = 2σ vβ /σ y , it follows that k(β) → 0 and so for all t ≥ T , One can check that this equation has a unique solution and thatΣ T = 0.
It only remains to prove the weak convergence of M t (β) to 0 asβ → ∞. For this we will invoke Theorem 2.1 in Prokhorov (1956) and prove the convergence of the finitedimensional distributions of {M t (β)} to 0 together with the compactness of the sequence {M t (β)} (see also Billingsley 1999, Chapter 2) . Let T = [T 1 , T 2 ] with T < T 1 < T 2 . In what follows, we define Λ(t, s) = Indeed, by the definition of M t (β) and Itô's isometry it follows for t 1 ≤ t 2 that D = M Suppose, we guess a quadratic value function of the form Π(t, M ) = α t M 2 + γ t for deterministic functions α t and γ t . The HJB equation is satisfied if and only ifα t − µ α t = 0, 1 − 2λ t α t = 0, and α t (σ 2 v (t) + λ 2 t σ 2 y ) +γ t − µγ t = 0. The first two conditions lead to λ t = λ 0 e −µt and α t = e µt /[2λ 0 ], for some constant λ 0 > 0. Replacing these two functions, the solution of the last differential equation is γ t = 1 2 λ 0 (C + Γ t ) e µ t + σ 2 y λ t 4 µ , for some constant C ≥ 0 (since Γ t ↓ 0 as t → ∞, C ≥ 0 is required to ensure that γ t ≥ 0 for all t). Note that the HJB condition does not provide any information about how to select the insider's strategy β t . (Effectively, we have solved the HJB using the fact that insider is indeed indifferent). To determine the value of β t we must turn to the market maker's filtering conditions (see Proposition 1) Σ t β t = λ t σ 2 y andΣ t = σ To complete the proof, we need to specify the values of the two constant λ 0 and C and verify that the proposed value function Π(t, M ) = α t M 2 + γ t and trading strategy β t effectively solve the insider's problem. This final step is achieved by imposing the transversality condition lim t→∞ e −µ t E[Π(t, M t )] = 0 for β t .
To avoid confusions, we now use β t to denote the trading strategy in equation (12) and β t to denote an arbitrary policy in B. To make explicit the dependence of M t on a trading strategy {β s : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} we will use the notation M t (β).
Since Π(t, M ) = α t M 2 + γ t satisfies the HJB for any strategyβ ∈ B, it follows that Π(0, M 0 ) = E With these choices of λ 0 and C, the transversality condition is satisfied for β t , and taking limits in equation (25) In the last step we used (11) and β t > 0 for all t, and invoked the Lebesgue Convergence Theorem to interchange limits and expectations.
Proof of Proposition 2. The insider's ex-ante expected rent is
For t ∈ [T, ∞), Σ t = 0 and E[Π(t, M t )] = γ T . For t ∈ (0, T ),α t = µ α t , 2 α t λ t = 1, anḋ Σ t = dΣ t dα tα t = σ 
